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How Much Procedure Is Needed for Agencies to 
Change “Novel” Regulatory Policies? 
MING HSU CHEN† 
The use of guidance documents in administrative law has long been controversial and considered 
to be one of the most challenging aspects of administrative law. When an agency uses a guidance 
document to change or make policy, it need not provide notice to the public or allow comment on 
the new rule; this makes changes easier, faster, and less subject to judicial review. Under the 
Obama Administration, guidance documents were used to implement policy shifts in many areas 
of administrative law, including civil rights issues such as transgender inclusion and campus 
sexual harassment, and immigration law issues such as deferred action. The current 
administration has rolled back many of these policies and advanced its own positions. This Essay 
will focus on recent developments in the use of guidance documents with an eye toward analyzing 
the implications of the Trump Administration’s executive order on guidance. It begins by 
summarizing the issue of policymaking through guidance, highlighting the impact of recent 
issuances that stiffen procedural requirements for “novel legal and policy issues.” It illustrates 
the stakes of these changes using recent controversies in immigration law and civil rights and 
reflects on their significance for the administrative law of guidance. 
  
 
 † Associate Professor and Faculty-Director, Immigration and Citizenship Law Program, University of 
Colorado. This Essay derives from an AALS 2020 Hot Topics panel on regulatory guidance with panelists Nick 
Parrillo, Blake Emerson, Nancy Cantalupo, and Jill Family, which was itself inspired by an online symposium 
in the Yale Journal on Regulation about the guidance. Thanks to all who contributed to the conversation and to 
my co-panelists Chris Walker, Aaron Nielson, Dorit Reiss, and Zachary Price from the Hastings Law Journal 
Symposium for continuing the conversation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With volatile politics, novel legal and policy changes are to be expected. 
The manner in which these policy changes occur, and the bounds that can be 
placed on them, is a key question of administrative law. The use of guidance 
documents in administrative law has long been controversial and considered one 
of the most challenging aspects of administrative law. When an agency uses a 
guidance document to change or make policy, it need not provide notice to the 
public or allow comment on the new rule; this makes changes easier and faster. 
This Essay will focus on recent developments in the use of guidance to 
illustrate its usage in substantive policy arenas related to equality. Under the 
Obama Administration, guidance documents were used to implement policy 
shifts in many areas of administrative law, including civil rights issues such as 
transgender inclusion and campus sexual harassment, and immigration law 
issues such as deferred action. The Trump Administration has rolled back many 
of these policies and advanced its own positions. This Essay will focus on recent 
developments in the use of guidance documents with an eye toward analyzing 
the implications of the Trump Administration’s October 2019 executive order 
on guidance. Key questions include: (1) the classification of guidance and new 
procedures to formalize “significant guidance,” (2) whether the core concept of 
bindingness used to delineate the scope of guidance impedes change (and to 
what extent), and (3) the implications of this form of policymaking for 
administrative law. 
The Essay begins by summarizing the issue of policymaking through 
guidance, highlighting the impact of recent issuances that stiffen procedural 
requirements. It will then illustrate the stakes of these changes using recent 
controversies in immigration law and civil rights law, including DACA and Title 
IX sexual harassment on campus. 
I. GUIDANCE 
Federal agency guidance is prevalent in the administrative state, even 
though it is considered the “exception” rather than the rule in the text of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1 Not only is guidance numerous, it is 
varied. Agencies issue policy statements and interpretive rules; they post memos 
on their websites; they send letters to their grant recipients; and they provide 
operating manuals to their staff. Whatever their form, the consequence of issuing 
guidance outside the notice and comment procedures is that guidance is not 
(supposed to be) legally binding. 
Most agencies argue that guidance is essential to their daily operations and 
provides important direction to those they regulate about the laws they enforce 
and the benefits they dispense, while preserving needed flexibility to adapt to 
the circumstances of regulation or development of law. This tension between 
 
 1. Policy statements and interpretive rules fall within an exemption to notice and comment rulemaking 
under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2018). 
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stability and flexibility is a core dilemma in administrative law.2 Under 
administrative law doctrines, guidance runs afoul of APA requirements when 
they are overly “binding” on regulated parties.3 This bindingness is primarily 
shown through the legal effect on persons external to the agency, but the 
practical effects of guidance may be considered as well. Failure to satisfy 
requirements precludes the agency from using the document in a way that 
adversely affects private parties; satisfaction of the requirements makes their use 
permissible, even if it merits less deference from courts on review. 
In order to ameliorate the tension between clarity and flexibility, the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) commissioned a study 
on guidance and adopted best practices for how agencies should use nonbinding 
statements of policy. The study, titled “Federal Agency Guidance and the Power 
to Bind,” was carried out by Nicholas Parrillo and based on interviews with 135 
individuals, including current and former agency officials and regulated 
beneficiaries across eight regulatory areas.4 Parrillo found that the public often 
has a strong incentive to follow federal agency guidance, even though it is not 
binding law.5 The reasons flow from structural and organizational factors—not 
the agency’s intentions to take short cuts or unfairly coerce the public.6 A follow-
on study by Ron Levin and Blake Emerson concluded that similar principles 
should apply to interpretive rules, while acknowledging some differences 
between these two forms of guidance. The ACUS reports encourage notice and 
consultation, even if the agency does not seek out mandatory notice and 
comment procedures.7 For example, they suggest the agency provide written 
explanation for individual departures from guidance that is accessible to other 
agency officials and the public.8 ACUS adopted recommendations based on the 
Parrillo and Levin-Emerson reports in 2019.”9 
The Trump executive orders on guidance require more from agencies for 
less binding effect, similar to a Department of Justice (DOJ) Attorney General 
 
 2. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the 
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1359–63 (1992). 
 3. For a summary of the administrative law doctrine on legal effect, see Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking 
and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 273–74 (2018). Modern cases illustrate practical 
consequences. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 
1024 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 4. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, FEDERAL AGENCY GUIDANCE: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 4–6  
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/parrillo-agency-guidance-final-report.pdf. 
Descriptions of the study appear in Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An 
Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 173–74 (2019). 
 5. PARRILLO, supra note 4, at 177. 
 6. Id. at 174–76. 
 7. BLAKE EMERSON & RONALD M. LEVIN, AGENCY GUIDANCE THROUGH INTERPRETIVE RULES: 
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 33–36 (2019), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ACUS% 
20IR%20final%20report.5.28.2019.pdf; PARRILLO, supra note 4, at 5. 
 8. See Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,728, 61,742 (Dec. 29, 2017). 
 9. Adoption of Recommendations, 84 Fed. Reg. 38,927, 38,928 (Aug. 8, 2019). 
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memorandum in 2017.10 The Trump executive order on guidance requires that 
guidance documents be labeled and treated as nonbinding in law and practice.11 
It also requires agencies to make guidance “readily available” to the public 
(through publication or indexing on an agency website), to take public input 
during the initial issuance of their guidance, and to give a “public response” to 
major concerns raised in comments.12 The executive order applies to 
“‘[s]ignificant guidance document[s],’” defined by their economic significance 
and their raising of “novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, 
[or] the President’s priorities” among other factors.13 
The economic definition of significance is well-established and widely 
used.14 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Best Practices and other 
executive orders pertaining to guidance use the economic definition. The ACUS 
studies focus on regulatory areas governed by cost-benefit analysis—such as 
financial regulation, health and safety regulation, and consumer protection—and 
specify a threshold of economic significance. Marking policies for heightened 
procedure due to their novel legal and policy interpretations is new.15 In theory, 
the use of guidance in other policy arenas may serve non-instrumental, non-
economic values, such as elaborating how laws apply to novel situations in order 
to realize aspirational statutory mandates and communicating norms. The 
inattention to novelty in guidance interpretations leaves open questions about 
the appropriateness of using novelty as grounds for more procedure, the special 
import of requiring more procedure for novel interpretations of value-laden 
policies pertaining to contested norms of equality, and whether the rules calling 
for increased procedure strike the proper balance between notice and comment 
rulemaking and informal uses of guidance. This Essay undertakes a 
consideration of how novel policy and legal interpretations operate in equality-
based regulation under the Trump Administration’s guidance rules. 
 
 
 10. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the Dep’t of Justice, Prohibition on Improper Guidance 
Documents (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1012271/download. 
 11. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235, 55,235, 55,237 (Oct. 15, 2019). 
 12. Id. at 55,237 (referencing § 4(a)(ii)(A)). 
 13. Id. at 55,236 (referencing § 2(c)(i)–(iv)). Some exceptions to the heightened procedures are noted in 
the executive order as well. Id. at 55,237 (referencing § 4(b)). 
 14. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 12 (2017); CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN “MAJOR,” “SIGNIFICANT,” AND ALL THOSE OTHER FEDERAL RULE CATEGORIES? A CASE FOR 
STREAMLINING REGULATORY IMPACT CLASSIFICATION 14 (2017) (surveying nomenclature in laws and executive 
orders governing reporting of regulatory policy). 
 15. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. § 3(h)(1)(D) (2007) (defining “significant regulatory action” as 
including “novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles 
set forth in this Executive Order”). While this definition precedes the President Trump executive order issued in 
October 2019, agency applications and commentary focus on primary definition “[l]eading to an annual 
economic effect of $100 million or more.” Id. at § 3(h)(1)(A). 
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II. CASE STUDY ONE: CIVIL RIGHTS 
Civil rights retractions provide illustrations of how novel policy 
interpretations contained in guidance may become vulnerable to change. Two 
examples, both concerning the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil 
Rights (OCR)’s interpretations of Title IX, illustrate the divergent paths of 
rescission: the Trump Administration’s rescission of guidance extending gender 
nondiscrimination to transgender equality, and the Trump Administration’s 
rescission and replacement of sexual harassment guidance to allow more lenient 
campus grievance procedures. 
A.  TRANSGENDER INCLUSION 
The prototypical risk of advancing policy through guidance is that it can be 
rescinded in a subsequent administration. This is precisely what happened with 
OCR’s attempts to regulate transgender inclusion. Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments of 1972 provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance . . . .”16 A 2016 Dear Colleague letter advanced an 
agency interpretation extending Title IX protections on gender to transgender 
students.17 The implementing regulations state that “[a] recipient [of federal 
financial assistance] may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower 
facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of one sex 
shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex.”18 
The Obama Administration used this interpretation to remedy student 
complaints that single-gender bathrooms excluded transgender students.19 The 
remedy became universal access to bathrooms or single-stall bathrooms.20 OCR 
communicated its substantive policy interpretations without following notice 
and comment or other heightened procedures. 
The novelty of the interpretation can be seen in the legal and political 
reaction. Conservatives struck back against these interpretations based on 
substantive disagreements to transgender rights and procedural objections to 
announcing rights without rulemaking or legislation. Their opposition led to 
legal challenges to the federal interpretation and state laws, leading to a circuit 
split. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas enjoined the 
letter because it was a binding rule in disguise and therefore procedurally 
 
 16. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 17. CATHERINE E. LHAMON, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., & VANITA GUPTA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER ON TRANSGENDER STUDENTS (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf. 
 18. 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2018). 
 19. LHAMON & GUPTA, supra note 17, at 3. 
 20. Id. 
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invalid.21 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in G.G. ex rel. Grimm 
v. Gloucester County School Board adopted the OCR interpretations articulated 
in the very same guidance out of deference to the agency.22 In the face of these 
interpretive disagreements, the Trump Administration OCR rescinded the 
Obama OCR guidance. The Supreme Court then vacated and remanded the 
judgment in G.G. “in light of the guidance document issued by the Department 
of Education and Department of Justice.”23 
B.  SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUSES 
Title IX has also been interpreted to require schools and universities to 
guard against gender discrimination by instituting grievance procedures to 
rectify hostile environments on campus. The statute, previously described, 
provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance . . . .”24 A 1975 regulation implementing this provision 
requires educational recipients of federal funds to “adopt and publish grievance 
procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and 
employee complaints . . . .”25 Over time, OCR incorporated case law 
developments on hostile environment in its 1997 OCR Guidance on sexual 
harassment that requires schools’ “nondiscrimination policy and grievance 
procedures for handling discrimination complaints must provide effective means 
for preventing and responding to sexual harassment,”26 its 2001 Guidance laying 
out OCR enforcement procedures,27 and a 2011 Dear Colleague letter giving rise 
to specific standards of proof for school grievance procedures.28 The Dear 
Colleague form of these interpretations did not undergo rulemaking procedures. 
During the Obama Administration, campuses sought to comply with OCR 
guidance by adopting a “preponderance of the evidence” standard derived from 
 
 21. Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 830 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (“The Guidelines are, in practice, 
legislative rules—not just interpretations or policy statements because they set clear legal standards.”). 
 22. G. G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 722 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and 
remanded, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G. G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.). 
 23. 137 S. Ct. at 1239; see SANDRA BATTLE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., & T.E. WHEELER, II, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/ 
colleague-201702-title-ix.pdf (rescinding the May 2016 transgender guidance). 
 24. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 25. 45 C.F.R. § 86.8(b) (1975). 
 26. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third 
Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,044 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
 27. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: 
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, at iii–iv (2001), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf. 
 28. RUSSLYNN ALI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 10–11 (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2. 
ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. 
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the framework of civil lawsuits.29 In practice, this meant that consent between 
individuals was harder to show, such that accused students were more likely to 
be disciplined for violating sexual harassment policies. The Trump 
Administration changed this standard to allow campuses to adopt either a 
preponderance of the evidence or the stricter clear and convincing evidence 
standard, which emulates the criminal context and affords higher levels of 
protection to the accused.30 This is leading to fewer disciplinary actions against 
accused students. The state of play in this area is still developing. As this Essay 
went to press, the Trump Administration finalized its reversal of the Obama 
Administration’s guidance using notice and comment regulation.31 After a 
considerable wait while pending OIRA review, their rules were approved with 
an effective date for implementation in August 2020.32 They were challenged 
within a week.33 Though the ACLU litigation is pending, the case initially 
illustrates the triumph of procedure over the use of guidance to advance novel 
policy interpretations since the hurdles to reinstating the Obama Administration 
guidance are high. The extent of the substantive difference between the Obama 
interpretation versus the Trump Administration’s interpretation is a matter of 
dispute.34 Equality advocates indicate the implication of more procedure is a bias 
in the statutory interpretations that favor defendants over plaintiffs in civil rights 
cases, whereas supporters of the Trump interpretation claim that it is a modest 
change to the statute that will have little effect on gender equality on campuses.35 
Whomever is right, the episode shows that the use of guidance in policy arenas 
with contested values generates policy flux not undone with more procedure. 
The historical context of these recent civil rights policies shows increasing 
resistance to a longstanding practice of using guidance to advance novel policy 
 
 29. See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 902 (2016) (“In a 
scramble to be considered compliant and stave off or resolve OCR investigations, schools rushed to rewrite their 
policies and procedures to satisfy the [2011 Dear Colleague Letter’s] commands, including, most prominently, 
the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard.” (footnote omitted)). 
 30. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 5 n.19 (Sept. 2017), https://www2.ed. 
gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf. 
 31. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Funding, 
85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,059 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Know Your IX v. DeVos, No. 1:20-cv-01224-RDB 
(D. Md. May 14, 2020). 
 34. See Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to Be Free from Sexual Violence? Title IX Enforcement in 
Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1854–78 (2017) (providing a historical account of 
stickiness of Title IX); Blake Emerson, The Claims of Official Reason: Administrative Guidance on Social 
Inclusion, 128 YALE L.J. 2122, 2173–78 (2019) (elaborating on the doctrine behind this stickiness). 
 35. This point was made forcefully by Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Professor at Barry University School of Law 
and a consultant on sexual harassment policies for the Obama White House, federal and state legislatures, and 
the U.S. Department of Education, with her co-authors in Tiffany Buffkin et al., Widely Welcomed and Supported 
by the Public: A Report on the Title IX-Related Comments in the U.S. Department of Education’s Executive 
Order 13777 Comment Call, 9 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 102 (2018). 
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interpretations that fill in the gaps in a vague civil rights statute.36 Against this 
backdrop, the efforts of the Obama Administration to advance a novel 
interpretation were not atypical. However, pressure for heightened regulatory 
procedure functioned as a shield against expanding rights (transgender 
inclusion) and as a sword to institute less protective interpretations of equality 
law (sexual harassment grievance procedures). The episodes illustrate the limits 
of using guidance to bind an agency’s interpretation of the law, particularly at 
times when the overarching values in the interpretations are contested. Although 
the case studies arose before the Trump executive order on guidance, one can 
imagine that more procedure would not have saved transgender rights and that 
it would not have sufficed to supplant heightened evidentiary standards for 
reporting sexual harassment. 
III.  CASE STUDY TWO: IMMIGRATION 
Guidance documents play an enduring and distinct role in immigration law. 
As Jill Family explained in her Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 
presentation and elsewhere, historically, guidance documents are often the key 
source of immigration law.37 They are the vehicle for important policies 
concerning deportation and benefits adjudication.38 Many of the rules that help 
determine who may be deported and who is eligible for legal status or other 
forms of relief are contained in guidance documents and nowhere else.39 Major 
statutory concepts are interpreted only in guidance documents, and the 
consequence of one interpretation versus another can be the ability to remain in 
the country or be deported.40 Despite their importance, immigration agencies 
make little effort to provide notice or opportunities for comment on these rules.41 
Consequently, immigrants often did not know of the existence of guidance, let 
alone the meaning and intended use of guidance.42 The problems were 
exacerbated by the lack of attorney representation such that attorneys could not 
effectively advise their immigrant clients or represent them in court. 
 
 36. See, e.g., BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF PROGRESSIVE 
DEMOCRACY (2019); Ming Hsu Chen, Regulatory Rights: Civil Rights Agencies, Courts, and the Entrenchment 
of Language Rights, in THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION REVISITED: INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE U.S. (Lynda G. Dodd ed., 2018); Ming Hsu Chen, Governing by 
Guidance: Civil Rights Agencies and the Emergence of Language Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 291, 292–
96 (2014). 
 37. Jill E. Family, Immigration Law and a Second Look at the Practically Binding Effect, YALE J. ON REG.: 
NOTICE & COMMENT (May 6, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/immigration-law-and-a-second-look-at-the-
practically-binding-effect-by-jill-e-family/; Jill E. Family, Panel Discussion at 2020 AALS Annual Meeting: 
AALS Hot Topic Program, Recent Development: How Easily Can Agencies Change Regulatory Policy in 
Immigration & Civil Rights? (Jan. 5, 2020). 
 38. Family, Immigration Law and a Second Look, supra note 37. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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Three examples illustrate both these typical uses, and new atypical ones, 
of guidance. 
A.  DEFERRED ACTION 
If there is a pattern to the myriad of guidances, it is that, traditionally, the 
interpretations contained in guidance were favorable to immigrants, either to 
ameliorate a severe immigration statute or to diminish political attention to 
policy outcomes that were substantively fair but politically costly to legislators. 
The Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
program is consistent with this trend. President Obama used guidance to issue 
the DACA memo in 2012 and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans 
(DAPA) memo in 2014.43 Both of the resulting programs used deferred action 
to temporarily forbear deportation of undocumented immigrants who satisfy pre-
specified criteria—for DACA, individuals who arrived in the U.S. as children 
without status within a certain time period, and for DAPA, the parents of U.S. 
citizen children.44 Both built on a long line of exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion in immigration law.45 Though they did not use notice and comment, 
both programs formalized a series of prior enforcement memos by John Morton 
advising prioritization and developed systems and procedures to ensure more 
consistent implementation for those who qualified.46 Obama’s versions of the 
program required an affirmative application rather than a post hoc grant of 
equity.47 
The vulnerability of the deferred action programs as a product of guidance 
is most easily seen in DAPA. DAPA proposed using guidance, but did not make 
it into policy because of the twenty-seven-state challenge that lasered in on the 
insufficient procedure used for its enactment.48 
 A Fifth Circuit decision suggested the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) guidance was procedurally defective and was left 
in place when the Supreme Court stalemated 4–4.49 
A similar legal suit was threatened against DACA and would have been 
filed had the Trump Administration not rescinded DACA.50 The lesson is part 
politics and part law: Obama’s use of guidance was only briefly successful 
(lasting five years), and was always susceptible to rescission through political 
means once a conservative president came into office. Had Trump not rescinded 
 
 43. Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69 
ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 384 (2017). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015) (describing the history of prosecutorial discretion in American 
immigration law). 
 46. Chen, supra note 43, at 381–82. 
 47. Id. at 384–86. 
 48. Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355, 383 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Jan. 9, 2020). 
 49. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam). 
 50. Letter from Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney General (June 29, 
2017), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/files/epress/DACA_letter_6_29_2017.pdf. 
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DACA, it probably would have been a repeat of the legal lesson from Texas v. 
United States, with the DOJ’s assertion of the program’s illegality partly turning 
on whether it had been procedurally sound. 
While the Supreme Court has not yet issued its ruling on DACA, the 
lessons for administrative law are emerging: guidance is a risky endeavor when 
novel policy positions are contested and a costly one when beneficiaries begin 
to rely on the legal protections in a situation where they are withdrawn. 
B.  INVISIBLE WALL POLICIES 
In contrast with longstanding immigration practice and with DACA, the 
trajectory of the Trump Administration is to use guidance to the disfavor of 
immigrants. USCIS, the immigration benefit-granting agency within the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, has used guidance to curtail legal migration. 
It has revised and reversed interpretations to restrict admissions, prevent 
transitions to permanent status, and in some cases to deport. In other words, it 
has used the APA offensively rather than defensively against procedural 
challenge. 
A series of policies constricting legal immigration—collectively 
characterized as “invisible wall” policies51 by advocates—illustrates these 
tendencies. USCIS grants H-1B visas for temporary high-skilled workers. 
Defined by statute, the policies addressing when an applicant is eligible for H-
1B status have changed since the “Buy American, Hire American” executive 
order. The result is to throw into question whether computer programmers 
qualify as high-skilled and what evidentiary burdens must be met for an 
employer to sponsor such as worker.52 In response, approvals of H-1B petitions 
dropped 8% after many years of relative stability (95.7% in 2015, 93.9% in 
2016, 92.6% in 2017, and then 84.5% in 2018).53 Another example is the 
guidance-based definition of “unlawful presence,” which is now easier to accrue 
for international students, such that they may find themselves needing to leave 
the United States and barred from reentry due to a technical violation of their 
visa—for example, falling below the number of credits required for full-time 
students.54 
The Trump Administration’s USCIS is also using the procedures of the 
immigration bureaucracy to slow down the grant of immigration benefits. 
Increased requests for evidence and decreased deference to prior determinations 
 
 51. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYER ASS’N, DECONSTRUCTING THE INVISIBLE WALL (2018), 
https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-report-deconstructing-the-invisible-wall. For example, USCIS issued policies 
restricting the Economist classification under the TN visa, terminating work authorization for H-4 spouses, 
requiring “bridge” applications for F-1 students, and increasing its issuance of Requests for Further Evidence 
(RFEs), to name a few. Id. at 10–11, 18. 
 52. Id. at 9–10. 
 53. Ming H. Chen, Citizenship Denied: Implications of the Naturalization Backlog for Noncitizens in 
Military, 97 DENVER UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 54. Ming H. Chen & Zachary New, Silence and the Second Wall, 27 SO. CAL. I. L.J. 549, 560–61 (2019). 
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have resulted in backlogs of immigration benefit cases in nearly every category 
of benefit.55 Naturalization wait times have doubled, and the size of the backlog 
has increased by 30% or more.56 Applications from the military are being denied 
(or held up in background checks preceding the filing of the N-400).57 Many of 
these efforts to slow down and deny immigration benefits stem from executive 
orders that require agency officials to implement “extreme vetting” for national 
security or protection of American workers.58 
C.  PUBLIC CHARGE 
A related policy goal of the Trump Administration’s efforts to alter the 
quality of immigrants admitted to the United States is their effort to exclude poor 
immigrants. They pursued this policy along two regulatory avenues: (1) a U.S. 
Department of State guidance and (2) a USCIS rule. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) says “[a]ny alien who, in the 
opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the 
opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or 
adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is 
inadmissible.”59 Although the INA does not define “public charge,” the 
adjudicating officer must at a minimum consider: the applicant’s age; health; 
family status; assets, resources, and financial status; and education and skills.60 
The officer also may consider, or may require, an affidavit of support.61 The 
officially codified immigration policy of the United States includes a statement 
that noncitizens should “not depend on public resources to meet their 
needs . . . .”62 Those provisions originated in the Immigration Act of 1882 and 
 
 55.  Letter from Bipartisan Senators, U.S. Senate, to L. Francis Cissna, Director, USCIS (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.aila.org/advo-media/whats-happening-in-congress/congressional-updates/bipartisan-letter-senato 
rs-uscis-backlog; AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYER ASS’N, supra note 51, at 17–18. 
 56. COLO. STATE ADVISORY COMM’N, CITIZENSHIP DELAYED: CIVIL RIGHTS AND VOTING RIGHTS 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BACKLOG IN CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION APPLICATIONS 9 (2019) (“Since 2016, 
processing time for citizenship applications has almost doubled, increasing from 5.6 months to 10.1 months as 
of March 31st, 2019.”). 
 57. Chen, supra note 53. 
 58. See AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYER ASS’N, supra note 51, at 4–8. 
 59. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2018). 
 60. Id. § (a)(4)(B). 
 61. Id. The INA of 1952 excluded many classes of noncitizens from admission to the United States, 
including any noncitizens deemed likely to be a public charge. Id. § (a)(4)(A). The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 modified eligibility for federal benefits such that “‘qualified 
aliens’ are eligible for federal means-tested benefits after 5 years and are not eligible for ‘specified federal 
programs,’ and states are allowed to determine whether the qualified alien is eligible for ‘designated federal 
programs.’” Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,126 (proposed Oct. 10, 2018) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–14, 245, 248) (discussing the impact of the 1996 welfare reform law on 
noncitizen receipt of federal public benefits). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (IIRIRA) codified the minimum factors referenced above and placed an emphasis on the affidavit of 
support system. Id. at 51,132. 
 62. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A) (2018). 
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have been maintained in modern immigration law with few, if any, changes.63 
In 1999, the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS), predecessor to the 
Department of Homeland Security, published a proposed rule and Interim Field 
Guidance that defined “public charge” to mean an immigrant who either has, or 
is likely to become, “primarily dependent on the government for subsistence, as 
demonstrated by either (i) the receipt of public cash assistance for income 
maintenance or (ii) institutionalization for long-term care at government 
expense.”64 A similar proposal was put forward by the Department of State and 
incorporated into the Foreign Affairs Manual, which serves as a guide to 
Department of State adjudicators.65 However, these proposals were never 
finalized and INS adjudicators continued to follow the 1999 Interim Field 
Guidance and the State Department continued to follow the Foreign Affairs 
Manual until the Trump Administration intervened.66 
In January 2018, the State Department used guidance to enlarge the 
definition of public charge.67 More specifically, the State Department published 
revised sections of its Foreign Affairs Manual in conjunction with an interim 
final rule that concern whether a person seeking to enter the U.S. is likely to 
become primarily dependent on cash assistance on long-term care in the future. 
Longstanding factors are considered: age, health, income, education, and family 
situation.68 The new instructions add that using noncash benefits by a visa 
applicant or his family is considered as part of the totality of circumstances for 
the purpose of predicting whether a person will be a charge in the future.69 
Advocates raised concerns that the benefits exclusions would bar poor 
immigrants from entry to the United States. Like many of the “invisible wall” 
policies, these changes went into effect quietly and without notice or comment.70 
Compare these to USCIS’s more prominent attempts to push a restrictive 
definition of public charge for those seeking a visa or green card. The proposed 
rule sought to modify the definition of public charge to bar any noncitizen who 
receives one or more of the designated public benefits.71 Their rulemaking 
process was lengthy but hardly democratic. After months of advocacy, 266,000 
comments were filed, with most opposing enlargement of the definition of public 
charge. Many raised the concern that the tests disadvantaged poor immigrants 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 
28,689 (proposed Mar. 26, 1999) (proposed rule and notice of INS public charge rule). 
 65. Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 64 Fed. Reg. at 28,689. 
 66. See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114, 51,133–34 (proposed Oct. 10, 
2018) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–14, 245, 248) (describing the history of the public charge rule in 
the context of the INS 1999 Field Guidance). 
 67. Visas: Ineligibility Based on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 54,996, 54,996 (Oct. 11, 2019) (to 
be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 40). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 54,997. 
 70. Id. at 55,011. 
 71. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified 
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212–14, 245, 248). 
 
1140 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:1127 
and that they were unfair to those who had relied on them without notice of their 
future consequences; this was especially true for the consequences of family 
members using benefits.72 USCIS nevertheless adopted a “simplified duration 
standard,” under which a noncitizen “who receives one or more public benefit 
for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period . . . .”73 
This metric is incorporated into the “totality of the circumstances” weighed by 
an adjudicator.74 As a matter of process, the notice and comment procedure led 
to scarce changes in the final rule, suggesting that granting notice through a more 
formal procedure failed to create a meaningful opportunity to participate and 
little agency response. Though the rule was temporarily enjoined in multiple 
courts, the public charge rule is now being implemented nationwide.75 
The lesson from the immigration policies seems to be that a strong 
executive can advance novel interpretations of law through either guidance or 
rulemaking. Whether the interpretation survives is dependent on both political 
and legal forces. Sub-regulatory guidance is more susceptible to the whims of 
politics, as seen in the challenge to DAPA and the initiation of “invisible wall” 
policies. Heightened procedure insulates novel interpretations from eventual 
legal challenge, as seen in the public charge rule. Agencies choose the level of 
procedure that is expedient for their goals: they opt for less procedure when they 
favor preexisting interpretations or when traditions of deference do not require 
it—for example, if nonimmigrant visa denials are nonreviewable or a statute has 
long been enforced in a manner consistent with administrative priorities, even 
without guidance. They opt for more procedure when they want to slow down 
policies counter to their preferences or when legal challenges to their novel 
interpretations are contemplated—for example, if DACA recipients come to rely 
on an immigration benefit or if green card holders found inadmissible due to 
their likelihood of becoming a public charge raise due process concerns that 
courts will review. 
Whether these strategic calculations about the trade-offs of advancing 
novel positions without policy, with guidance, and with rulemaking would 
change under the Trump executive order on guidance is unclear. The Trump 
executive order on guidance carves out an exception for immigration agencies 
in enforcement related matters.76 The examples discussed in this essay show that 
asymmetric calls for heightened procedure—where procedure is demanded of 
immigrants and not of the agencies themselves—can turn guidance into a sword 
 
 72. Preliminary studies show that the introduction of the rule interpretations has produced a chilling effect on 
the collection of benefits, even before the rule’s implementation. Jeanne Batalova et al., Millions Will Feel Chilling 
Effects of U.S. Public-Charge Rule that Is Also Likely to Reshape Legal Immigration, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 
(Aug. 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/chilling-effects-us-public-charge-rule-commentary. 
 73. Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. at 41,297. 
 74. Id. 
 75. In January 2020, the Supreme Court voted 5–4 to lift a nationwide injunction on the public charge rule 
and allow the Trump Administration to implement the rules beginning February 24, 2020. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020). 
 76. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235, 55,238 (Oct. 15, 2019). 
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to advance aggressive immigration enforcement policies more often than a 
shield for immigrants’ rights. 
CLOSING REFLECTIONS ON THE LESSONS FROM EQUALITY-BASED POLICIES 
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The contemporary case studies of agencies issuing equality-related policies 
demonstrate that the age-old question of whether agencies should advance novel 
policy through guidance is brought into sharper relief as we experience novel 
policy change. If novelty is enough to trigger heightened procedural 
requirements, how is novelty to be measured? Is the baseline the underlying 
statute or is it the policy interpretation that immediately preceded the change? 
Does it need to be the first time an interpretation has been adopted? Does the 
scale of change matter—that is—how different the new policy may be from prior 
precedents? Does the direction of the policy position matter? 
The threat is all the larger in a polarized political environment with intense 
disagreement over norms and values of equality. Whether agency guidance 
interpretations should be stable or flexible in the area that implicates civil rights 
and fundamental liberties depends on the nature of the substantive issues at 
stake, as well as the underlying procedural issues and structural issues that are 
the core subject of trans-substantive administrative law debates. However, 
substance and policy are inextricably linked to equality because regulated 
parties’ adjustments to change are not as simple as shifting money or changing 
practice. Equality norms can be advanced through legal and policy 
interpretations articulating or elaborating on statutory rights contained in 
vaguely worded legislation. The durability of those rights can be weakened by 
openness to policy change. To the extent that bindingness is considered 
undesirable under doctrinal tests of legal and practical effect, civil rights can be 
weakened to the detriment of those who relied on them and remedial statutory 
ambitions can be blunted. Whether guidance that expands or contracts civil 
rights and immigrants’ rights merits special consideration is pertinent to 
administrative law’s core concerns of legal effect and emerging doctrines about 
the scope and terms of policy changes expressed in guidance documents. To 
what extent, and in what manner, do we consider the reliance of the regulatory 
beneficiaries or the investment of the regulatory challengers and change 
advocates? Does it matter if these affected individuals have a lesser ability to 
adapt to changes than institutions navigating primarily economic effects? 
Raising the pitch of these questions: does it matter if partisanship stands in 
for real contestation over reasonable disagreements over substantive values? 
These persistent questions show that the debate over regulatory guidance in the 
context of equality is infused with politics. The Trump Administration’s 
regulatory policies have been unabashedly pro-industry, anti-civil rights, and 
anti-immigrants’ rights. They have not been solicitous of equality values. These 
policy interpretations strive to use procedural formality as a sword to strike down 
old interpretive positions and a shield to guard against social progress. How 
much procedure is needed to promote a novel policy depends in part on whether 
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the underlying policies are viewed as legitimate policy differences or raw 
assertions of power in politics. 
Returning to the problem posed in the title: how much procedure is needed 
when agencies seek to change novel policies relating to equality? The 
experiences of the Obama and Trump administrations suggest that we do not 
want too much procedure,77 and yet we do not want too little procedure either.78 
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